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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

** *

~

******

FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
-vs-

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

UTAH TURKEY GROWERS, INC., a
Utah corporation,

Civil No. 16354

Defendant and
Respondent.

* * * * * * *

~ ~

* *

~

*

~

*

~

****

NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant's Statement of the Nature of the
Case is argumentative.

While Plaintiff-Appellant does seek a

money judgment against the Defendant-Respondent and Respondent
did sell turkeys in which Appellant claimed a security interest,
Respondent nevertheless paid to Appellant all sums Appellant's
debtor could have demanded, and retained only those sums necessarily expended for processing and sale.

While Appellant claims

it had a security interest in the turkeys and their proceeds, the
Respondent claims that by waiver, acquiescence and express
consent all curtailments by Respondent were ratified and approved
by Appellant.

Appellant not only asks that Respondent pay twice

but also asks that Respondent pay Appellant twice.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Trial Court, the Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Sixth
Judicial District Judge presiding without a jury, granted judgment
for the Defendant-Respondent on the Complaint and dismissed the
counterclaim against the Plaintiff-Appellant for over-payments to
it.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Respondent asks this Court to affirm that
portion of the lower court judgment which dismissed PlaintiffAppellant's complaint.

Respondent has not appealed from that

portion of the trial court's judgment which dismissed its counterclaim.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Record on Appeal is divided into two parts.

The

pleadings, other filings, discovery proceedings, and the Findings
and Judgment will be referred to as the Record ("R. ") the testimony
as the Transcript ("Tr.") and the Exhibits as "Exh.".
Respondent will use the same designations Appellant has
assigned to identify the parties.
The Defendant-Respondent, Utah Turkey Growers, Inc.
(hereafter UTG) is, and since 1973 has been, an agricultural
marketing cooperative which processes and sells turkeys raised by
its member growers.

During the period 1973 through 1976 one of

its member growers was a partnership comprised of Ivan E. Carlson.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered
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Clair R. Carlson and Vernon J. Carlson,

(hereinafter known as

Carlson Brothers).
Plaintiff-Appellant (hereafter Bank) had financed the
turkey-growing operations of Carlson Brothers for some time both
prior to and including the years 1973 through 1976 (Tr. 32-33,
257).

Carlson Brothers executed security agreements and finan-

cing statements in favor of the Bank for the years 1973 through
1976 (Exhibit P-4, Tr. 32,

257-259) creating a security interest

in Carlson Brothers' turkeys.

(Exhibit, P-4)

UTG honored this security interest and at no time
material to these proceedings, nor at any time since Bank
commenced its code filings, did UTG disburse any funds otherwise
due Carlson Brothers other than directly to Bank with one Bankapproved exception (See Finding #8, R.263).
Bank had the burden of proving any payments made out of
the trust created by its code filings but upon an abundance of
uncontradicted evidence the Trial Court found:
[Finding #8; R. 263,264]
* * *at all times material to these
proceedings the Defendant [UTG] paid to the
Plaintiff [Bank] all of the proceeds which
the Defendant received from the sale of
turkeys delivered to the Defendant by
Carlson Brothers and that checks or other documents
were admitted into evidence which established that no
payments were made by the Defendant out of the trust
imposed by the Uniform Commercial Code filings.
(See also Tr. p. 334)
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NARRATIVE HISTORY OF THE THREE-PARTY RELATIONSHIP
A condensed history of the association between Debtor
(Carlson Brothers), Creditor (Bank), and the Defendant (UTG) may
present a better organization of the operative facts.
Carlson Brothers had been financed by Bank for many
years (Tr. 32, 33, 257).

Bank, pursuing its own interests, gave

the incorporators of UTG some advice influencing UTG's structure
suggesting, among other things, that Carlson Brothers should
take a majority of the contemplated stock in the first (SubChapter "S") corporation (Tr. 364-367).
(Tr. 365)

That advice was accepted.

When UTG converted its corporate anatomy to become a

cooperative Ivan Carlson became the President (Tr. 212, 268).
In 1971 UTG became a turkey processing and marketing
non-profit cooperative (Ex. D-23, 24) which received live birds
from its constituents, slaughtered, dressed, froze,

stored and

then sold them, and thereafter settled from time to time with
its members (Tr. p. 367) or their creditors, where appropriate
(Tr. 334).
The Bank wanted - had to have - Carlson Brothers'
turkeys processed and sold to yield debt service funds (Tr.
98).

Live birds could not be sold in Utah (Tr. 367, 368).
UTG engaged "master" sales services for the bulk of

its growers' turkeys through membership in a national marketing
co-operative, Norbest Turkeys,

(Tr. 331, 332) \vhich made cash
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered
- 4by the
- Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

payments and struck provisional settlements with UTG for birds
oftentimes still in Norbest's freezers, having not yet been
sold (Tr. 333).

Such cash payments were made for unsold 1974

turkeys relying on remarkably high 1973 prices (Tr. 373).
Because the growers needed funds (Tr. 372) this cash was, in
accordance with UTG's long-accepted practices and course of
dealing compelled by the economic requirements of its growerconstituents, distributed by UTG to members; except that Carlson
Brothers' entitlement went to Bank (Tr. 334, 373; R. 263).
While UTG had been paid by

~orbest

for thuse stored

birds at 1973 prices, the turkey market plunged in 1974 by 20
cents per pound (Tr. 375).

Projecting Carlson Brothers' six

million pounds of production (Tr. 384) through this market
decline will yield a justifiable and could have prompted a
highly probable overpayment to them of $1.2 million dollars;
however, the overpayment was not that high.

A director of

Norbest (Tr. 237) testified that it was necessary for Norbest
to make "reverse settlements" (charge-backs) with its member
co-ops, one of whom was UTG,
(Tr. 239, 240).

to adjust for this steep decline

A Norbest computer did not detail this over-

payment (Tr. 360) and a qualified auditor was consulted, in
general terms, about possible risks in advances who said "It
looks all right to me."

(Tr. 380)

So the overpayment continued

to be carried forward in UTG' s belief that proper "adjustments
\·!ere

being made" either through the computer or by Norbest (Tr.

379) .
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The trial court found no negligence or basis upon which
to claim estoppel from these events (Tr. 393 - From the Judge's
bench ruling).
Bank's claim, although rejected by the trial court for
many other reasons, that each year comprised a segmented, independent episode whose settlement is definitive and not

influent~l

to, or influenced by, that of any other year or years, is
likewise discredited by other factors which contributed to overpayments to Bank for credit to the loan of Carlson Brothers:
(l) enormous carry-overs for two years and longer of frozen
turkey inventories (Tr. 48, 114, 220, 335; Exh. P-35) were
allocated to the members' accounts; and (2) Federal regulatory
agencies required $650,000.00 of improvements to UTG's plant
(Tr. 381, 382).

Financing through the Sacramento Bank for Coops

and operating on a cost-plus, progress payment basis, UTG was
experiencing cash flow not from earned income from 1972 through
1974 but from debt it was creating and still owes (Tr. 382).
The impact of this would not have been realized until 1975
settlement time arrived (Tr. 383).

Hhen that impact did emerge the I

same CPA firm was asked to investigate which did not report
until 1976 (Tr. 383).
For these, as for many other reasons shown hereafter,
each year's activity is inextricably bound up with each other
year's economics and all are tied together.
In December, 1974 a check was issued to Bank for
$262,362.47 (Ex. P-18) as an advance against Carlson Brothers'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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production which Carlson Brothers obviously had earned (Tr. 288,
385); then in August, 1975 a check was made to Bank for $759,337.97
(Exh. P-19) which was an estimate of total earnings to Carlson
Brothers for 1974 birds but which did not take into account the
prior July's check.

It was overlooked by a Mrs. Mickelsen, the

bookkeeper, who testified that it was "just an oversight" (Tr.
288).

But Ivan Carlson was President of Utah Turkey Growers at

the time of the check (Tr. 212) and according to the only testimony
on it, given Carlsons' large annual production of $3,000,000.00,
the August 1975 check was not perceptibly large (Tr. 385).
The following is a chronology and summary of excess payments to Bank on behalf of Carlson Brothers (From Exh. P-16):
CUMULATIVE

DETAIL

1973

1974

1975

hoportionate share
(49/'o) of excess
payments to members
~ 1973
$64,254
hoportionate share
(36/'o) of excess
payment to members
~ 1974
i

DEFICIT

$ 64,254

$184,881

$120,627

Excess cash
payment

$272,725

$457,606

After UTG set off the over-payments to Carlson Brothers
against later years' production, Carlsons still owed (and yet
o1,e) UTG $31,213.00 (Exh. P-35).
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WAIVER OF SECURITY INTEREST GENERALLY
Throughout this time the Bank certainly did not become
alarmed and although they could and should have identified the
over-payment if UTG was expected to, did not show any concern
for the account (Tr. 370).
Indicative of either the Bank's inattentiveness or
indifference to the Carlson Brothers' account at UTG or its
approval of disbursements by UTG for Carlson Brothers' account,
is a matter pursued at the trial, rejected by the trial court,
and abandoned by Bank on appeal:
Bank demanded that they be reimbursed, as a consequence
of conversion, for $183,713.22 which UTG paid, to a hatchery
firm for Carlson Brothers' turkey poults in the year 1974,
out of Carlson Brothers' entitlement to distribution of the
cooperative sales (R. 172, 196).
The uncontradicted testimony at the trial was that the
Bank "would have approved" purchase and payment by UTG of
Carlson Brothers' poults out of the latter's production and
while denying that they had expressly authorized it unequivocally!
declared that they countenanced "the procedure"

(Tr. 118).

I

I

Ivan Carlson testified that UTG and Carlson Brothers hac [
been expressly authorized by Bank to make such payment (Tr. 272)
and the Court so found (Finding jf9; R. 264).
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Bank knew that Carlson Brothers' turkeys were being
processed and sold and the proceeds from the sales received and
administered and disbursed totally by UTG (Tr. 89).

One witness

for Bank acknowledged (Tr. 98) and the Norbest director (Tr. 243)
and other uncontradicted testimony (Tr. 368) established that there
was no other way Carlson Brothers' turkeys - or anyone else's could be converted to cash.
Bank did not want a security interest in the birds live,
processed or frozen.
as they did.

They wanted UTG to conduct their affairs just

The Bank officers visited the plant, asked general

questions about handling turkeys, identifying the pool and inquired
about settlements but never advised UTG of the amount of their
loans or of Bank's opinion of the financial condition of Carlson
Brothers or any apprehensiveness concerning it.

(Tr. 370, 371; See

also Tr. 224, lines 10-12 where Mr. Harward testified that the Bank
"never asked about the condition of Carlson Brothers' account")
HAIVER OF SECURITY INTEREST IN PROCEEDS
There were many "carry-back" and "carry-forward" adjustments during all of this period (Tr. 220, 254, 324).

Bank's loan

officer who was pre-eminent in this transaction acknowledged he
knew that there was carry-over storage (Tr. 48, Lines 8

& 9) ·

Being aware of carry-forward inventories he nevertheless did not
inquire to determine that inventories would be carried into years
exceeding two (lines ll-15) although he did indicate he was aware
of the inventory "pool" (Lines 21, 22).

(See also Lines 1-5, Tr.

i,g)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respecting the $183,000.00 poult check of October, 1974,
the Bank was approached about a direct payment from Carlson Brothers' account to S
1974 poults.

& R Hatchery to provide Carlson Brothers with

Bank's loan officer testified, "I think the procedur;!

in the past was to see that the poults got paid for" (Tr. 118).
Bank's officer Marlo Cloward when approached about the
matter by Ivan Carlson, said that he "didn't have any objection to
it" (Tr. 272).

Bank had a listing of poults as they were received

by Carlson Brothers (Tr. 270).

Bank was cautious to list

them~

number and age (brood) on their security agreements (Exh. P-4).

If Bank had insisted upon a year-by-year accounting and settlement I
they could have easily projected poult numbers into grown birds,
grown birds into poundage, multiplied that figure by market prices
and determined the aDount of check they should have received from
Carlsons' production.
anytime.

There is no evidence that they did so at

Nor is there any evidence that Bank, by the same com-

putations either for their own purposes in determining whether or
not to make future advances to Carlsons or to ascertain that Bank
had been overpaid - as they had - observed the $262,000.00 excess
payment in the August, 1975 check (Tr. 293) which they then might
have called to the attention of UTG.

BANK'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENCE
The trial court ruled that there was no negligence to
be found in any conduct of UTG.

In Finding #10 (R.265) the
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Court found that ''the failure to detect issuance of the earlier
check in making the payment of August 15, 1975 was neither
ordinary or gross negligence*

*

*nor did it constitute failure

to exercise due care but was an inadvertent mistake".

This was

based on evidence that, given Carlsons' consequential annual
production, the check of 1975 did not appear to be large (Tr.
385).

It was also based on high magnitude carry-over from year

to year of frozen inventories (Tr. 220).

The Court also found

(Finding #12; R.266) that it was of no pecuniary advantage to

' UTG that its officers misrepresent or make any representation in
negligent disregard of any duty it might have to First Security
to make statements concerning poundage standing to Carlson
&others' credit (R.266, 267).

The Court found (Finding #15)

that the letter of January 7, 1976 concerning poundage was made
~

good faith and was the product ,of the exercise of ordinary

prudence and due care, was made gratuitously and without the
intention of gaining an advantage to itself (R.268).
This finding is likewise based upon uncontradicted
evidence.

At the time of this letter UTG did not know it would

have to impose upon Carlson Brothers any charge-backs

(Tr. 222,

223) .
When Bank solicited the letter of January, 1976, they
did not ask about any monies Carlsons may owe the cooperative

(UTG) but only asked about the inventories (Tr. 224).
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Intervention by Federal inspectors required UTG to
borrow funds and disburse them at different intervals (Tr. 381,
382).

The "buriecl" deficit was not unusual in the industry (Tr.

239) and in particular in the case of Carlson Brothers (Tr.
385).
The precipitous drop in turkey prices (Tr. 375) could
not but have thrown accounts, in which inventories were a
dominant factor, out of smooth-flowing administration.

Other

turkey cooperatives became unbalanced by the same price perfidies
(Tr. 239,240) and an auditor indicated there was no risk in
making the advancements which later resulted in reverse settlements or set-offs (Tr. 380).

UTG having "cashed out" a six

million pound prod'Kcion of Carlson Brothers with a proportionately like amount to its other producers could not have prudently
kept the cash in reserve when its farmers needed the money (Tr.
373).

UTG had no control over the 1974 year in which poult

market conditions and prices reached "disastrous" proportions
(Tr. 382).

This "disastrous year" could not have been reflected

until the 1975 settlement (Tr.383) and at that time Carlsons had
become indebted to UTG by over $450,000.00 (Tr. 127,128).
More pervasively, the Court found that the Bank did
not at any time change its position based upon failure to
know of any of the facts disclosed by audit and that there
was no actionable neglect or negligence or any failure to
exercise due care attributable to the Defendant or any of its
agents or officers (R.271).

The Court expressed this in his
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bench ruling (Tr. 393) stating that there was no actionable
negligence and no conduct upon which the Bank could predicate
an estoppel.

These findings were based upon the substantial

evidence catalogued above.
"LIVE FLOCK" CONTRACT
In its brief (pp. 5-7, 13, 14) Bank emphasizes a
"live flock" contract which it says altered the marketing
arrangement between Bank, UTG and Carlson Brothers.

This

agreement was not made known to UTG until June, 1976 prior to
which time Bank was firmly entrenched in and financially
committed to its 1976 loans to Carlson Brothers (Tr. 96).
Consequently, there could have been no prejudice to them.
Carlsons were already well into production (Tr. 225) and
could not have gone any other place for processing birds (Tr.
240, 321).

The "live flock"

agreement did not change the

relationship between any of the parties but dealt with accounting
for the purpose of sales only (Tr. 183).

"~ile

there was a

separate accounting procedure it was only to the extent that
Carlson Brothers' turkeys were not "pooled".

In effect UTG

bought the turkeys from Carlson Brothers (Tr. 183, Exh. P12).

UTG did not become a debtor of Carlson Brothers because

i·.·hen the "live flock" agreement was executed Carlson Brothers
~ed

UTG far in excess of Carlson Brothers' 1976 production.

(Exhs. P-16, P-35).
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CONTINUOUS NATURE OF UTG' S TRANSACT_IONS AND ACCOUNTS WITH MEMBEK'
Long-term carry-over of substantial frozen turkey inventories (Tr. 220, 114, 48, 335); continuing Norbest "reverse
settlements'' (Tr. 25); plant renovations and debt retirement
therefor (Tr. 382); growers' provisional settlements out of
monies borrowed against stored inventories (Tr.

219) as well as

the fluctuation of equity position of plant ownership by reason
of its debt (Tr. 382) all illustrate a long course of dealinginvolving all grower members of UTG as well as Bank's entitlement
to turkey proceeds - which galvanizes the testimony of witnesses
that no production season was severable from the others (Tr.
335) and there was never any "final" settlement (Tr.

387).

The period 1973 - 1976 embraces all the credits, debits.
and set-offs and it

~s

:='ank' s evident purpose to segment each of

the years within that period and endeavor to create a new
relationship emerging at the conclusion of any growing period
and the beginning of a new turkey pool.

For the foregoing

reasons this simply was not the case.
The trial court found that:
(Finding #6)

* '~while there was an annual period to which
production of different years could be assigned
* * *there was no specific cut-off or ending period
where settlements were final as to any production
or marketing processes; but there was a continuous
and uninterrupted series of transactions which
extended through all of the years material to
these proceedings* * *by a course of dealing
~'
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by the parties which required the making of
credit as well as debit entries and the continuous
carrying forward of an inventory of frozen turkeys
* * *also in part the product of sharply fluctuating
market prices*** (R.263).

NO INTENT TO MISLEAD OR PURPOSE TO GAIN PECUNIARILY
In the Brief of Appellant the Bank talks about "the
impact" of UTG's negligence (Brief, p. 27) and UTG's "pecuniary
interest" in Carlson Brothers' continued financing by Bank
(Brief,

p. 31).
Reading those two statements together, as they are

presented in the Brief, there may arise an implication that
Carlson Brothers was such a valued constituent of UTG that it
would be in the latter's interests to induce Bank to continue
financing Carlson Brothers to sustain its turkey production.
lfuile no direct claim of intentional deception follows those
point headings they do require an answer.

At Page 222 of the

Transcript Gaylord Harward was asked if he had any intention of
deceiving First Security Bank by the letter of January 7, 1976
to which Bank's counsel objected.

The objection was sustained

after Bank's counsel stated:
The contention of the Bank is that they
were negligent and that they were not trying
to be fraudulent.
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There is, in fact, no evidence to support negligence
and none was offered to show fraud or deception.
More importantly there is nothing in the record whatsoever to show that UTG would gain a pecuniary advantage by
Carlson Brothers'remaining in the cooperative or that financing
was required to keep them in or that if financing was required
it could not have been obtained elsewhere than from First
Security Bank.
RELIANCE BY BANK
Bank's best testimony was that it relied in part on
information from UTG in determining whether or not to finance
Carlson Brothers in 1976 (Tr. 52).

One witness said, "It was

a very basic factor" in the decision to extend credit for the
1976 operations (Tr. 101).
The office manager of UTG did not ever intend that any
information he gave Bank would be relied upon for new credit.
As Bank's Brief (p.8) correctly analyzes the dialogue he [the
office manager] assumed the Bank wanted the requested information
because Carlson Brothers had outstanding obligations it owed to
the Bank (Tr. 155).

In other words, he anticipated no new con-

sideration premised upon the information he furnished Bank in
good faith.
We have researched the record

sedulously and represent ,

to the Court there is no testimony that the Bank would not have
made any loan to Carlson Brothers or declined any further advan·
ces had they known the statistics, the economics, or any facts
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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AGREEHENT BETHEEN CARLSON BROTHERS AND UTG FOR SET-OFF
A meeting was held in mid-1976 of all the members of
UTG at which the over-advance

to growers, including Carlson

Brothers, was discussed in view of the audit and audit reports.
Although they did not specifically discuss an off-set in the
meeting,

Ivan Carlson stated that "it was just something that we

had always taken care of.
(Tr. 279, 280) .

We just expected it to be done*

*

*"

Indeed, Hr. Carlson testified that there had

been set-off charges of a similar nature in every year but not
of as major a nature as the one involved here

(Tr. 262).

However, in one instance Carlson Brothers had been under-advanced

$10 to $12,000.00 which had been made up to them in later vears
(Tr. 387).
All members of the Carlson Brothers partnership agreed
that the set-off had to be made (Tr. 264).
ASSIGNMENT UNDER 70A-9-318
In July, 1976, First Security Bank prepared for Carlson
1
.r.
Brothers an assignment which "authorized and instructe d UT G to
make all checks or amounts due us from the sale of stored
turkeys or live turkeys, past, present and future to First
Security Bank".

The instructions were thereafter to leave the

came of Carlson Brothers off checks for their production.

(Exh.

P-ll) .
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STATEMENT OF QUESTIONS UPON \.JHICH THE APPEAL TURNS
I

1] WHETHER OR NOT A COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION
IS COMPELLED TO PAY A MEMBER'S CREDITOR TWICE, DUE TO PRIOR
UNINTENTIONAL OVERPAYMENTS TO THE SAME CREDITOR.

1

2] WHETHER OR NOT A COOPERATIVE M~Y BE REQUIRED TO
PAY A MEMBER'S CREDITOR MORE THAN IT OWES THE MEMBER.
3] WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING T~T THE ,
CREDITOR ~D WAIVED ITS SECURITY INTEREST IS BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
4] WHETHER OR NOT A COOPERATIVE ~S A HIGHER DUTY TO
A MEMBER'S CREDITOR THAN IT OWES THE MEMBER TO AUDIT AND VERIFY
THE MEMBER'S ACCOUNT.
5] DOES A STRANGER TO A COOPERATIVE'S DEALINGS ~VE A
RIGHT TO RECEIVE - AND DOES THE COOPERATIVE ~VE A CORRESPONDING
DUTY TO GIVE T~T STRANGER - GRATUITOUS INFORMATION INNOCENTLY
INCOMPLETE UPON WHICH THE STRANGER MAY RELY?
6]
DOES GIVING INNOCENTLY INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
CONSTITUTE ~EGLIGENCE \\THERE ALL INFORMATION ASKED FOR WAS
SUPPLIED?

ARGUMENT
PREFACE
It is better practice to confront an Appellant's
Brief point against point, serially; however in this case one
rule of law which Bank ignores overwhelms all the provisions,
statutory and common law, advanced by its brief and one
principle governing the scope of review so affects the entire
appeal that we respectfully treat those consjderations first
following which we will respond, in order, to Bank's several
claims of error.
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POINT I
I

ANY CLAIM OF BANK CAN NEVER RISE TO A LEVEL HIGHER
THAN RIGHTS WHICH CARLSON BROTHERS COULD ASSERT
AGAINST UTG AND THOSE RIGHTS WERE EXTINGUISHED
BY OVER-PAYMENT.

I

A.

APPLICATION OF THE RULE HAS BEEN EXPANDED
BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (§70A-9-318)
RESPECTING ASSIGNMENTS.

B.

BANK'S ONLY RIGHTS ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ASSIGNMENT.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
There is a doctrine co-existent with the law of assign-

A
lNG

ments and chattel mortgages that the rights acquired by a

{

claimant pursuant to assignment, subrogation, mortgage, pledge,
or hypothecation can rise to no higher level in dignity, quality
or amount than those of the assignor.
of New York,

27 Ad.2d 427, 279

Chemical Bank vs. State

N.Y.S. 2d 813.

An assignee

acquires no greater right than was possessed by his assignor and
simply stands in the shoes of the latter.
Assignments,

§102.

6 AmJur 2d p.282,

The assignee is subject to any setoff or

counterclaim available to the obligor against the assignor.
at p. 283.

Id.

Likewise, the rights to which a subrogee succeeds

are subject to the limitations, burdens and disqualifications
incident to them in the hands of the party to whom he is subrogated.

73 AmJur 2d 666, Subrogation, §107.
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A.

THIS PRINCIPLE IS CODIFIED BY THE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS CHAPTER OF THE UNIFORM COt:2•!ERCIAL
CODE IN SECTION 70A-9-318, UCA, 1953.

Section 70A-9-318 (l) and (2) lJCA, 1953 provide in
substance that the rights of an assignee are subject to "all
the terms of the contract bet\.Jeen the account debtor and
assignor and any defense or claim arising ther£>from", or unrelated thereto.
Under subsection (l)

(a) it !'lakes no difference

whether the breach giving rise to the defense occurs before or
after the account debtor is notified and under (l)(b) the
account debtor may maintain defenses and claims against the
assignee c:c: .cin2 i;-;clcpendently of the contract.
(2)

if

t~e

_

-~~3ct

Under subsectio:l

is modified in good faith and in accord-

ance with reasonable commercial standards it is effective
against an assignee regardless of notification to the account
debtor.
Here UTG is the "account debtor", Carlson Brothers is
the "assignor" and Bank is the "assignee".

The "contract

right" is not the security agreement but is the entitlement of
Carlson Brothers to obtain their proportionate share of the
proceeds of the common pool during the period 1973 through
1975 and the live flock of 1976.

(S0e 70A-9-l06 and Offirial

Comments of National Conference of Commissioners on ilniform
State La\vS [hereafter "Code

Comm~Cnts"])
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The "contract" between the account debtor (UTG) and
the assignor (Carlson Brothers) is made up of the organic
instruments of UTG which provide for processing and sale of and
distribution of net proceeds to members by the cooperative from
the turkeys handled (Exh. D-23 and 24) together with the course
of dealing and usage of trade (70A-l-205) which have grown up
through their 10 years of business dealings (Tr. 364).

Among

those business dealings is the revolving account of advances,
settlements, reverse settlements, charge-backs and set-offs.
The "contract right" of llTG to set-offs inherent in that
arrangement is that to which Bank is expressly subject.
"Notification" in this case might be the constructive

io:.l

notice achieved by filing the financing statement with the
Secretary of State or by notice of the 1976 live flock agreement.
However, notice is not required because the defenses, set-offs,
and counterclaims UTG asserts all arise out of the contract.
(70A-9-318(1) [a]).
As Bank admits in its brief, and as the record
establishes, all of UTG's set-offs against Carlson Brothers,
and therefore against Bank's lawsuit, are as a result of
indebtednesses from Carlson Brothers to UTG created before
either the 1976 filing or the 1976 live flock agreement.

(App~

ellant's brief, p. 10; Exh. P-16).
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B.

BANK'S RIGHTS ARE IN THE NATURE OF AN ASSIGNMENT.

The security interests of the Bank have all the
characteristics of an assignment and cannot be applied in the
same way that a conventional security agreement - financing
statement arrangement might otherwise be enforced (i.e. by
taking possession of the collateral, by foreclosure, or public
or private sale, ecc.).

The Bank recognized that they had in

practice and in fact created their security interest by assignment rather than by the Code filing when First Security drafted
and Carlson Brothers executed Exhibit P-12 which is an assignment
of "all checks or amounts due us from the sale of stored turkeys
or live turkeys, past, present and future."
Bank's

~ndE~standing

is further illustrated by the un-

contradicted evidence that Bank certainly did not want possession
of the turkeys, either live, dressed, packaged or frozen (Tr.
38).

A literal enforcement of the security agreement upon

default, i.e.:
absurd.

delivery to them of the turkeys, would be

Bank's permission to UTG that it deduct processing,

poult purchase, Norbest commission, storage and all other
charges (Tr. 38; 114; 230; 262; 272; 280) and its acquiescence
in carry-forward of large inventories and the use of them as
collateral for loans from Norbest (Tr. 48) waived Bank's
literal and strict rights to enforcement against "first generatic!
proceeds. Clovis National Bank vs.

Tho~as,

1967); Hedrick Savings Bank vs. Myers,

425 P2d 726 (N.M.

229 NVI/d 252 (Iowa,
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1975)

The practical construction of the parties placed on
the instruments became in fact the same as an assignment.
Assignments, under the Uniform Commercial Code, are
security interests and have been placed by the Code Commissioners
in the chapter on Secured Transactions (Section 9-318).

The

term "security interest" includes those in contract rights
[Section 70A-l-201(37)].
Bank's collateral is the "contract rights" Carlson
Brothers held against UTG.

[70A-9-10S(c)]

The contract rights

include any right to payment under a contract not yet earned

lt

and not evidenced by an instrument (70A-9-106).
Section 9-318 of the Commercial Code subjects assignents of that type of contract rights to all defenses and all
terms of the contract between the account debtor (UTG) and the

on

assignor (Carlson Brothers) and any defense or claim arising
from or under the contract.
Respecting subsection (1) of 9-318, the Code Comment
states:

io

I

Subsection (1) makes no substantial change in
prior law and assignee has traditionally been
subject to defenses or set-offs existing before
an account debtor is notified of the assignment.
\ihen the account debtor's defenses on an assigned
account* * *or a contract right arise from the
contract between him and the assignor it makes
no difference whether the breach giving rise to
the defenses occurs before or after the account
debtor is notified of the assignment. The account
debtor may also have claims against the assignor

))
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which arise independently of that contract.
Uniform Commercial Code, American Law Institute
National Conference of Uniform State Laws, Z962
Official Text, with Comments, p. 693.
(The Official

Text 1972 adopted substantially by Utah in Laws, 1977
Chapter 272 is not materially different)
Subsection (2) of 70A-9-318 allows the original parties I
to the assigned contract - in this case UTG and Carlson Brothers

·1

to adopt modifications of the contract which are commercially

I

reasonable even after notification of the assignment (See Code

I

Cormnent #2).
In the Oregon Supreme Court decision of Investment
Services Company vs.

1972)

North Pacific Lumber Company,

492 P2d 470 (0:

Section 9-318 of the Model Code was applied to sustain a

defense against perfected code filings in a case weaker on its
facts

t~an

[~G

presents here.

In that case a lumber manufacturer

assigned a series of contracts to the Plaintiff Bank.

The lumber

purchaser (account debtor) observed defects in the first

shipme~

and set-off its claim for defective lumber in payments made to
the Bank.

The rationale of the decision is that because of the

over-payment to Bank by the account debtor respecting the first
shipment made the legal consequences identical to a "loan" by th<
account debtor to the Bank and whenever the Bank acquired a clai:
against. the account debtor it was entitled to set-off that amour.:
I

just the same as it would have had against a loan which the Bank I
had made to the Defendant.

[492 F2d at 472]
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I

The rights of the assignee of an account receivable
are subject to contract defenses or claims of the account debtor
arising by virtue of the terms of the contract out of which the
receivable was created.

(See Gilmore, "The Assignee of Contract

Rights and his Precarious Security", 74 Yale L .J. 217, 230 (1964)).
James Talcott,

Inc.

vs.

H.

Corenzwit and Company,

387 A 2d

350, 76N.J. 305 (1978).

POINT I I
THE LAWSUIT BROUGHT BY THE BANK, CONTAINING
ELEMENTS OF SECURITY INTERESTS AND CLAIMED
NEGLIGENCE, IS STRICTLY AN ACTION AT LAW
~~ THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS ARE TO BE
GIVEN CONTROLLING IF NOT DISPOSITIVE WEIGHT.
A.

SUITS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ARE ACTIONS AT LAW.

An extraordinarily important rule adopted in all
these cases, both those cited for support of Bank's as well as
UTG's position, is that they are actions at law and the trial
court's findings, if supported by any credible evidence, are
to be given controlling weight.
vs. Long Creek Meat Company,

Baker Production Credit Assn.

513 P2d 1129, the ruling on which

Bank relies almost exclusively, was decided entirely on the
conclusive effect accorded the findings of the trial court on
review.

Correspondingly, in Hedrick Savings Bank vs. Myers,

229 NW2d 252 (1975) the Iowa Supreme Court states:
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This is a law action tried without a jury.
The trial court's findings are binding on
us if supported by substantial evidence.
Such findings have the effect of a jury
verdict to be disturbed only if induced by
an erroneous application of law.
As to the method the Iowa Supreme Court utilized in
applying this principle to a Uniform Commercial Code case, it
proceeded:
The question whether plaintiff's lien was
waived by authorizing various sales to
defendants raises controversial issues
under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial
Code* * ~~we hold there is substantial
evidence to support the trial court's finding
that, from the very beginning of plaintiff's
relationship with Eckley, sales of livestock
pledged as collateral were made to various
dealers.
Plaintiff had knowledge of this,
raised no objection, accepted checks from
these sales for credit to Eckley's account,
and clearly relied on Eckley's honesty to
properly account for the proceeds. This
established a course of dealing from which
thetrial court could find, as it did,
implied authority to sell to defendants in
the challenged transactions~~ ,., 1<We find
both the result and the rationale of Clovis
and cases which follow it more persuasive
and we now adopt it* * *We rely on* * *the
principle that evidence of a course of
dealing has relevance in interpreting agreements
under the Uniform Commercial Code* * *We now
hold a prior course of dealing may, upon
proper proof, constitute authority to sell
pledged collateral under [70A-9-306]
As used in the statute, "otherwise" should be
construed to include a prior course of
dealing. (See Uniform Commercial Code (1972)
J. White and R. Summer, pp. 84-86)
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The trial court here made the following finding:

The Court finds that the Plaintiff knew
approved, ratified, desired and expected that
the Defendant would and was organized to slaughter,
dress, process, store in frozen condition,
transport to destinations within and without
the State of Utah, and ultimately sell the
turkeys upon which Plaintiff had filed financing
statements based upon security agreements from
Carlson Brothers and that the Plaintiff by words,
acts, conduct and instructions as well as by
acquiescence and implied consent, waived its right
to claim or assert any conversion or any right of
action against Defendant for the tort of converting
turkeys grown by Carlson Brothers and delivered to
the Defendant for the services performed by the
Defendant.
The Court finds that the Defendant
did not at any time interfere with the rights
of the Plaintiff in or to the collateral covered
by the Plaintiff's security agreements and financing
statements but finds that every service performed
by the Defendant for Carlson Brothers and respecting
the turkeys grown by Carlson Brothers added value
to the product and was done at the instance, request,
consent. and acquiescence and affirmative approval
of the Plaintiff.
The Court finds that
those services were not available elsewhere.
[Finding No. 5, R. 262]

B.

SUITS BASED UPON NEGLIGENCE ARE ACTIONS AT
LAW AND FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE NOT
TO BE DISTURBED UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST THE
WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE.

In CiuJ:rlton

l'S.

Hackett,

11 U2d 389, 360 P2d

176 (1961) Justice Crockett wrote:
In considering the attack on the findings
and judb~ent of the trial court it is our duty
to follow these cardinal rules of review:
to
indulge them a presumption of validity and
correctness; to require the appellant to
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sustain the burden of showing error; to review
the record in the light most favorable to them;
and not to disturb them if they find substantial
support in the evidence.
In Artgerman Company,

Inc.,

vs.

Edgemon,

76 U 394, 290

169 (1930) this Court in a decision that has never been overruled or modified held that findings respecting negligence by a
court sitting without a jury if based upon substantial evidence
will not be over-turned.

The decision states, "This Court is

powerless to interfere with it even if it was disposed to do so".
(76 U at 400)

See also olesperson vs.

P2d 1050, 119 U 235 (1950); Santi vs.
L+42 P2d 921,
Larson,

21 U2d 157 (1968);

Deseret News Pub.

Co.,

Denver & R.

R.

G.

Leon Glazier & Sons,

W.

Inc.,

225

Co.,

vs.

491 P2d 226, 26 U2d 429 (1971).
The qe1estion of negligence is an issue of fact precluded

from review (5 ArnJur 2d 271, Appeal and Error, 829), and even if
there is a direct conflict in testimony upon a matter of fact the
question of negligence* * *must be left to the jury [or trier of
fact]

to determine (57 ArnJur 2d 343, Negligence,

§7).

A finding

by the trier of fact on the standard of care to be applied is a
determination of fact, not one of law.

See pp. 38, 39, infr·a.

SUMMARY OF POINTS I AND II
It is our respectful contention that the foregoing two
axioms:

(Point) I, it is impossible to heighten, by assignment,

the dignity of a claim; and (Point) II the scope of review shouL
be limited by those rules applicable to actions purely at law,
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galvanize all of UTG's arguments hereinafter which address the
several points of Appellant's brief.

POINT III
THE BANK \<JAIVED ITS SECURITY INTEREST IN
THE 1973 THROUGH 1976 CARLSON BROTHERS'
TURKEYS AND IN THE PROCEEDS THEREOF AND
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SO HELD.

It is well settled that a private statutory right can be
28 AmJur 2d 850, E:;toppel and f·.aiver,

§164.

Rights in

a perfected security interest under the Uniform Commercial Code
have been judicially determined waived by the secured party.
Clovi.s -''. 1 ::.t;~onaZ

E',1nk vs.

Thomas~

425 P2d 726 (N.M. 1967);

cases cited therein.
The definition of waiver is an intentional choice to

2 I

forego some right or advantage which one might have demanded or
28 AmJur 2d, p.837, Estoppel and Waiver,

insisted upon.

§154.

I

In the

r:ov~P

case, supra,

the secured party held an agreement

prohibiting sale of the collateral ,,-,ithout prior written consent.
U~on a

finding that the secured party had permitted the debtor to

sell the collateral, the New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
security interest was terminated and no conversion resulted either
in the collateral or its proceeds.
In the

C!cl'ic

case the Bank even told the Defendant that

it had some interest in the cattle and asked that the Bank be
n~med as a party on the check.

The Court concluded that the Bank
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intentionally abandoned a known right by not exercising its
clearly understood, unqualified privilege to require authorization to a sale.
The Bank cites Baker Production Credit Association vs.
Lon,; Creek Meat Company,

513 P2d 1129 (Ore. 1973).

The issue in

that case, however, was not whether the secured party had consen ted to the sale thereby waiving the security interest; it was,
rather, the conditional character of the consent.

The Oregon

Supreme Court held that the consent was expressly conditioned

on

!

the secured party's requirement that it be paid out of the
proceeds.

The proceeds were not paid to the secured party, the

condition of the waiver was therefore not met and a conversion
occurred.

In Baker the Oregon Supreme Court recognizes the

Clovis principle of waiver by stating that a secured party is
preferred except

~he~e

he waives his interests by authorizing

actions* * 1•which are inconsistent with that interest.
The Baker case is clearly no precedent for the proposition Bank urges upon this Court.
Clovis, on the other hand, is accepted as law by every
Court commenting upon its result and was paid the ultimate
respect by the legislature of New Mexico which expressly legis1

lated the holding pertinent to this issue out of existence.
Vermi ZZion PCA vs.
Ann.

Izzard,

'53, SOA-9-1-205(4)).

249 NE2d 352 [Ill. 1969])

(See

(N.M. Stat.

Utah's legislature has taken no such

action.
In Clovis, New Mexico holds that there was then no
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I

provision of the Uniform Commercial Code displacing the law of
waiver and particularly law of waiver by implied acquiescence or
consent.
~lithin

lissociation vs.

tl-te

case of Vermillion County Production Credit

Iz::.ard>

249 NE2d 352 (Ill. 1969) Clovis is still

accepted as law unless there is legislation auxiliary or supplemental to it.

To avoid the consequence of Clovis the Illinois

Court reasoned that when its legislature adopted the Uniform
Commercial Code a companion enactment made it unlawful for a debtor
to sell or dispose of security and fail to pay the secured party
the proceeds due under the security agreement saying that under a
penal statute even a course of dealing or use cannot raise an
estoppel or constitute a waiver.
It is significant that when the Utah Commercial Code was
adopted an existing penal statute made it a crime to dispose of or
take property out of the State in violation of a lien instrument.
(See former Section 9-1-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953)

This was

expressly repealed by the same chapter of the Laws of Utah, 1965
I·Jhich inaugurated Utah's present commercial code.

L. Utah

'65,

Chap. 154, p. 579.
Even in spite of the extensive renovation of the Utah
Comuercial Code in 1977, Section 70A-9-306(2) has never been
cJOclificd.

In light of the extensive comment and controversy upon

dnd surrounding C! ou is>

it must be presumed that the Utah legis-

lature's omission to amend Section 70A-9-306(2) was intentional.
:2 CJS p. 860,

ct.seq. :·~atut<s>

§372.
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POINT IV
THIS IS NOT A CASE FOR RESTITUTION NOR ONE INVOKING
THE PRINCIPLES OF RESTITUTION.
A.

THERE \.JAS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT.

We are unable to expose any predicate for "restitution"
in this case.

It is axiomatic that restitution is an equitable

remedy to require an unjustly-enriched defendant to restore to
an injured plaintiff monies wrongfully held.
Either being based upon the foregoing or upon a
contract implied in law an unjust enrichment is basic to the
subject of restitution and approached as a fundamental principle thereo:'.

Prrtatement of the Law of Restitution,

§l.

The :av.' 1-Jill never imply a promise to pay where it
would bF

;r.; ..-'t to the party to whom it would be imputed and

contrary to equity so to imply it.

Restatement of Restitution,

§§107 and 155.
Quasi-contractual liability for unjust enrichment is
based upon the ground that the person receiving a benefit which
is unjust for him to retain ought to make restitution or pay
the value of the benefit to the party entitled thereto* * *
[and] whether, by the receipt of the funds in controversy, the
defendant was enriched at the loss and expense of the plaintiff
66 AmJur2d p. 946, Restc"tutiCJn

,uid

Implied

ro>:ihlC'i.D,

~3.
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The problem with Hank's position here is that UTG
was not enriched in any way by these transactions, justly or

unjustly.

Bank's brief itself charts meticulously the aggre-

gate deficit in Carlson Brothers' account accumulated by
payments, not to Carl sons but to Bank itself:

(l) "reverse

settlements" for the years 1973 and 1974 because of advances
by Norbest exceeding the ultimate liquidated price for 1974
Carlsons' turkeys;

(2) a check for $262,000.00 paid- not to

Carlsons but to Bank - in December, 1974; and (3) failure to
deduct that check from a check of $759,000.00 - paid to Bank
and not to Carlsons - in July, 1975 which did not reflect the
December advance to the Bank.

None of these

circlli~stances

resulted in any unjust enrichment to the cooperative.

They

resulted in a temporary unjust enrichment to the Bank.
The element of unjust enrichment is entirely absent.
If there is no appearance of unjust enrichment there is no

basis for restitution.

B.

66 AmJur2d, at p. 947.

BANK RECEIVED MORE THAN IT WAS EVER
ENTITLED TO RECEIVE.

In Tlu.·nrwid

lie,;

tern Company vs.

Union Pacific Railr-oad,

12 U2d 256, 365 P2d 65, this Court held that to prevail on
the theory of unjust enrichment a claimant must show that the
money sought v.•as received under such circumstances that would
give offc·nse to equity and good conscience to permit the
~c·o:s('s;;or to retain it.
•s

UTG does not have any money which it

rr·t;lining.
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Exhibit P-16 shows that in 1973 Carlson Brothers were
over-advanced $64,254.79 representing their fair share of a
calculated charge-back for that year totaling $130,811.30; in
1974 were over-paid $120,627.23 representing their share of toti
charge-backs of $335,075.62 and in 1975 were over-paid $272,725.~·1
I

because of the 1975 check which duplicated a 1974 payment and
that $457,608.00 had been over-advanced beyond their productioo
as of May 28, 1976.

Every other member of the cooperative

sustained a similar charge-back (See p. 1 of P-16).

As Plaintif:l

brief acknowledges only $345,000.00 of this amount was set off in
1976 and $113,000.00 in 1977 but UTG was unable to recover
$31,000.00 of excess payments (Exh. P-35).

Bank did not release

any security, as its crief intimates, but retained and received
its rights in ::he: second generation proceeds of the 1975 and 1976
turkey crop.

Bank's inattention to the Carlson Brothers account

is not chargeable to UTG.
In Bank's brief it complains that a set-off was exercised against Bank's expectancy under the 1976 "live flock"
agreement.

This agreement was not negotiated until June, 1976

and there is no evidence of actual or constructive notice of it
prior to that time (Exh. P-12, P-13).
Under the authority of the cases cited in Points I
and II of this brief the live flock agreement, being a contract
between Carlson Brothers and UTG assigned to Bank, is subject
to all set-offs and counterclaims provided in 70A-9-318 under
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ere

both subsections (1) and (2) because they "arose out of the
contract" and "accrued before the account debtor (UTG) received

n

notification of the assignment".

total

1

,:~

725

This satisfies the requirements of subsections (a)
and (b) of subsection (1) of 9-318 and furthermore, because

''·I

nd

ion

Carlson Brothers and UTG modified their contract in good
faith and in accordance with reasonable corrnnercial standards,
they made the modification (an express agreement to a set-

~ntiffi

ff in

1

off) effective against the assignee (Bank)

(Tr. 279, 280).

The tenuous argument of Bank that it was unjustly
deprived or the Bank unjustly enriched by any of these transfers,

ease

all of which were made directly to the Bank, prompts a

ved

consideration of what Bank would have done if the mistake had

1976
)lint

been an under-payment to Carlson Brothers of an equal amount.
Bank certainly would have immediately demanded a complete
accounting and complete payment and would not be asserting
estoppel, restitution, unjust enrichment, or "final settlements".
Bank's claim of equitable and good conscience remedies

6

focuses attention immediately upon UTG's other grower members

it

who would be compelled to sustain a direct loss, not a divestiLure of inequitable retainage, equal to the total amount which
Eank would recover if they were successful in this lawsuit.

:t

- 35 -
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POINT V
THERE WAS NO NEGLIGENCE.
A.

THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ON NEGLIGENCE
ARE BASED ON UNCONTRADICTED EVIDENCE IN VIRTUALLY
EVERY INSTANCE.

The following are the facts upon which Bank predicates
its claim that UTG was negligent:

(1) An employee of UTG failed

to deduct a December, 1974 check \vhen she !'lade the annual
settlement in August, 1975.
Bank (Exh. P-18, 19).

However, both checks went to the

There was no question but that the

$262,000.00 check when it "'as issued in December, 1974 would have
been well within Caclson Brothers' production for that year (See
Exh. P-35

sho~~n~

~=~

~3les

of $2,124,090.00).

The only testi-

money concerning the check was that in view of Carlson annual
production the check issued in August, 1975 for $759,000.00
(Exh. P-19) would not have appeared "large" and it certainly
did not even look like an error to Carlson Brothers \vho said
that "We had brought into the Bank and Bank had received a couple
thousand more than what we had anticipated they would receive"
(Tr. 263) and it certainly must not have appeared "large" to the
Bank because they made no effort to repay it.
(2) Gaylord Harward should have told Bank in the
January, 1975 letter that Carlson Brothers' account would be
subject to ensuing set-offs because of their indebtedness to
UTG.

This letter (Exh. P-19) states facts,

for example:
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it answered the questions he was asked which were limited to
the number of pounds to Carlson Brothers' credit in storage
as well as in current production (Exh. P-9).
sentence is:

"You requested a letter as to current status on

turkey sales".
begins:

The opening

The first sentence in the second paragraph

"As you are aware", making it plain that First Security

had already made its own calculations concerning Carlsons'
tonnage.

The next sentence of that paragraph tells how much

has been advanced against that tonnage which is a statement of
actual fact.
In the telephone conversation requesting the letter
there was no inquiry about money, only tonnage, and no inquiry
about the status of Carlson Brothers' account, only about an
inventory on hand (Tr. 223).
(3)

UTG made excess advances in the year 1973 and 1974.

UTG relied on statements by an accountant (Tr. 380) and the belief
that proper adjustments were being made either through the
computer or by Norbest (Tr. 379).
The issue of negligence is a mixed question of fact
and law, often precluded from review (5 ArnJur 2d 271, Appeal
1nd EJ'ror,

829).

Where two or more inferences can be reasonably

deduced from the facts a reviewing court will not substitute its
deductions for those of the trial court.
i>'colworth Co.,

Simmons vs. F.

W.

329 P2d 999 (Cal. 1958).
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The standard applied in negligence cases is that of
reasonable or ordinary care to which one is held and the standard to which one is held is found in the conduct of a reasonably
prudent person in like circumstances, not demanding extraordinary
skill, caution or foresight (65 CJS 442, Negligence,

§1(4)).

That determination is likewise for the trier of fact (57 ArnJur 2d
342, Negligence,

B.

§7).

DETERl1INATIONS BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
ISSUE OF NEGLIGENCE ARE NOT TO BE DISTURBED
ON REVIEW IF SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

The findings of the trial court are entitled to controlling weight if there is any evidence in the record upon which
they can be

s~sta~~ed

in an action at law and all those

cases cited by buth Appellant and Respondent hold that an actioo
under the Uniform Commercial Code is an action at law (Clovis

National Bank vs. Thomas,

425 P2d 726 (N.M. 1967); Baker Product-::

Credit Association vs. Long Creek Meat Company,

513 P2d 1129

(Ore . 1 9 7 3) ) .
There was no contradiction of the testimony appearing
at pages 11 and 12 of this brief.

The only conflict is the

interpretation placed upon, rather than a conflict in, the
facts.

Bank claims that there was a negligent misrepresentatioo

in the January 7, 1976 letter.

The trial court found what stan-

dard of care should have been applied in this case which findi~-
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one of fact and the province of the trier of the facts.
AmJur 2d 342, Negligence,
Order of Sisters,
Elmer vs.

(57

§7. See also McMul Zen vs. Ursuline

246 P2d 1052 (N.M. 1952).
Vanderford,

445 P2d 612, 614 (Wash. 1968) holds:

There are two classes of cases in which the
question of negligence may be determined by
the court as a conclusion of law* * *The first
is where the circumstances of the case are such
that the standard of duty is fixed, and the
measure of duty defined, by law, and is the same
under all circumstances* * *and the second is
where the facts are undisputed and but one
reasonable influence can be drawn from them* * *
Therefore, only where the "precise measure of duty
is clearly defined" does the issue of the standard of care in
a negligence case become a question of law taken away from the

trier of fact.

Clark vs.

Joslin Dry Goods Company, 262 P2d 546

(Colo. 1953).

C.

EVEN IF NEGLIGENCE EXISTED IT HAS NOT
ACTIONABLE.
BANK HISINTERPRETS THE
RESTATEHENT OF TORTS.

Hhile the Court has found as a fact that the letter
' of January 1976 (Exh. P-9) was not negligent it also is
demonstrably not actionable even if acknowledged to be negligent.
Bank has misinterpreted Section 552 of the Restatement
of Tor·ts and Official Comment in attempting to apply them to the

January, 1975 letter.
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We agree that those provisions are applicable to this
case and that Bank has correctly quoted parts of the text and
comment.

The American Law Institute has unmistakably concluded

that as a condition precedent to liability for a statement,
although negligently made, the declarant must have a pecuniary
interest drawing from which he can obtain a benefit to himself as
a result of conduct reasonably to be expected as a response from
the person to whom the statement is made.
The Restatement of Torts reads:
§552.

Information Negligently Supplied
for the Guidance of Others.

(1)
One who, in the course of his business,
profession or employment, or in any other
transaction in which he has pecuniary interest,
supplies false information for the guidance of
others in tl-.eir- business transactions, is subject
to liabii:'.c-' :u::- pecuniary loss caused to them
by their J~stifiable reliance upon the information,
if he fails to exercise reasonable care or
competence in obtaining or communicating the
information.
[Emphasis added]
The Official Comment states:
Comment on Subsection (l);
c.
Pecuniarw interest in the transaction.
The rule stated-in Subsection (1) applies
only when the defendant has a pecuniart
interest in the transaction in which t e
information is given.
If he has no pecuniary
interest and the information is given purely
gratuitously, he is under no duty to exercise
reasonable care and competence in giving it;\" -;, -:,;
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d.
The defendant's pecuniary interest
in supplying the information will normally
lie in a consideration paid to him for it
or paid in a transaction in the course of
and as a part of which it is supplied* * *
* * *that the information is given in the
course of the defendant's business, profession
or employment is a sufficient indication that
he has a pecuniary interest in it, even
though he receives no consideration for it at
the time. [Emphasis added].
Bank's error is in concluding that a statement made
either "in the course of his business" or in which declarant
has "a pecuniary interest" will be sufficient.

It is clear

that the Institute requires that the statement be made in all
events in a transaction in which the declarant has a pecuniary
interest which may, but need not necessarily, be inferred
from the fact the declarant is making the statement, acting
"in the course of his business".
In Harger

& James "The Law of Torts", §7.7, it is

even more strongly put:
When the action is for false and fraudulent
representations [and] the person making the
representation is not a party to the
transaction and in no way profits by the
act of the party defrauded in reliance on
the representations made by him, he is
liable for damage only in case he knows the
representations made by him to be false,
and makes them for the purpose of deception,
and with the intent that they shall be
relied on and acted on by the person to
whom they are made and loss or damages
results therefrom.
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Bank improperly asks the Court to conclude that if
a declarant is in the course of his activities or business
pursuits it necessarily follows that anything he does has a
"pecuniary interest" attached to it.

For a negligent mis-

statement to be actionable it must be made for the purpose of
producing

a reaction to the statement that would develop a

pecuniary benefit to the declarant. Restatement of Torts,
§552, supra.

(It is important to keep in mind that the court

found the statement not to be negligent.)
All the testimony that can be found from the record
reflects only that while Carlson Brothers was a valued and
friendly associate, UTG was able to conduct its affairs
successfully without them (Tr. 171, 240, 338) and that there
are adequate

r~-~ey

growers to fill UTG's plant capacity

(Tr. 24, 242) .
Bank is struggling when it endeavors to link up a
chain of events beginning with Bank's imprecise inquiry for and
UTG's responsive statements to Bank, and produce even the
possibility of any pecuniary interest to be derived therefrom
by UTG.
First, it is not sufficient that UTG values Carlson
Brothers' membership.

It is essential, to establish their

pecuniary interest, that UTG benefited monetarily from
Carlson Brothers' membership.

This absolutely is not shown

by the evidence but would be insufficient if it were.
More importantly, it is essential to show that
financing by some creditor was required to keep Carlson
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Brothers in the cooperative, of which there is no evidence,
and furthermore,

it is necessary to show that even if financing

by some institution were required,

First Security Bank was

the only one who would have furnished that financing.

None

of those elements is shown in the evidence.
Even if it were concluded that an act "in the course
of one's business'' is sufficient in and of itself to constitute
actionable negligence, the acts of Mr. Harward were clearly
outside of the cooperative's purposes and any duty of MI.
Harward as its employee.
It was not in the course of business of UTG to
advise any third parties, creditors or grower members or
anyone else, of the status of accounts of grower members
Those circumstances have a confidential, classified privilege.
UTG had no pecuniary interest in disclosing that information;
therefore,

the inference Bank attemps to draw from Comment

(d) fails.

The term "in the course of his business" means

for, on behalf and to the benefit of a client, employer,
patron, or other principal to whom he owes a duty of fidelity
like an accountant owes a duty to a business hiring him, a
lawyer to his client, and a salesman to his merchant-employer.
The inference approved by Comment (d) might be sustainable if
an accountant supplied a statement to a firm by whom he was
employed and the accountant had reasonable cause to believe
ur should have suspected that the statement would reach third
parties, not in privity with the accountant, who may act upon
it to their detriment,

in which case the statement may be

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 43 -

actionable.

However, the courts have not as yet developed

this as established law.
P2d 806 (Utah 1974).

MiZUncr us.

FZm,·r Fox;: rc'.,

Annot. 46 ALR3d 979.

529

In this case,

Gaylord Harward was not an accountant, was not engaged in the
course of his business for UTG when he wrote the letter of
January, 1976 and was not pursuing any purpose for his superior
when the statement was made.

57 CJS 298, Master and Servant,

§570b.
No inference of negligence can be based on mere
surmise, guess, speculation or probability.
Motors Corp.

vs.

Joly,

Continental

482 P2d 244 (Wyo. 1971).

Neither can

negligence be established by a mere inference or conjecture.
To warrant a finding of negligence the evidence must establish
the essential facts as probably, not merely possibly, being
true.

McConnell v:.

ci·~.J;,omu

tJas and F:lectric Companu,

563

P2d 632 (Okla. 1977) (See also Simmons vs. Wooluwrth Co.,
supra.)
POINT VI
THE ISSUE OF MUTUALITY IS NOT RELEVANT TO THIS
CASE.
UTAH TURKEY GROWERS COULD EXERCISE A
SET-OFF AGAINST CARLSON BROTHERS AND OWED BANK
NOTHING FURTHER THAN ANY EXCESS.
Bank 1 s brief argues an undefined requirement of "mutual it'
as a condition precedent to set-off.

The only authority cited

by Bank is a subsection in the Article Set-Off and
Counterclaim of Corpus Juris Secundum.

The context from

which Bank 1 s authority is abstracted has to do with the defense,,
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a\'ailable to pu1;chasers, for value and without notice, of claims
~

chases in action as well as holders in due course of nego-

tiable instruments or other freely-transferable demands.

In

fact, the heading which Bank q~otes deals not with the substance
of set-offs but with "Crosr. Demands" (80 CJS, p. 74).

The

title to §48 is "Parties to anr. Mutuality of, Cross Demands"
and the substance of the treatise immediately following is drawn
from suits in Hhich a cros:>claim or counterclaim is asserted and
the cases footnoted obviously support only the rule that
rights of strangers to the litigation cannot be used by a party
in defending an action brought against him.

The Bank's citations

regarding mutuality also reflect cases whose purpose is to prevent
viecemeal litigation.
If there had ever been any requirement of mutuality
conditional to a set-off it has been obliterated by Section

9-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code which expressly grants
' the right of set-off in triangular disputes.
Comment, pp. 627, 693)

(1962 Code

We respectfully observe that this point

, "eeds no further discussion.

POINT VII
THERE WAS NO PREDICATE FOR PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
OR A HAIVER OF UTG'S RIGHT TO SET-OFF AGAINST
CARLSON BROTHERS AND B~NK
Estoppel and waiver of a fundamental right are not
~'Lerally favored in the law.

In fact it is commonly stated
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that estoppels are odious because they exclude the truth
and are used, in accord with good conscience, honesty, and
reason only, and wherever it is necessary to prevent fraud
(31 CJS pp. 291, 292, Estoppel,

§3).

To invoke the doctrine of estoppel, every element of
fact essential to it must be proved clearly and the evidence
must be certain in every particular and it must not leave the
matter doubtful or uncertain (31 CJS, p. 775, Estoppel,
In Corporation Nine vs. Taylor,

§162).

30 U2d 47, 513 P2d 417,

this Court said:
In looking at the principle of estoppel as
applicable to the evidence here these observations
are pertinent. The determination of such an
issue is not dependent on the asserted subjective content of the mind of the person
claiming he was misled.
The test to be
applied is an objective one as to what a
reasonable and prudent person in the circumstances
might conclude; and the burden of proof and
of persuasion as to the issue of estoppel is
upon him who asserts it.
The refusal of the trial court to so find is indulged
with the usual presumptions of verity; and this
court on review will not overturn his determination
and compel such a finding unless the evidence
clearly preponderates to the contrary.

To constitute an estoppel by conduct, there must exist
a false representation or concealment of material facts;

it

must have been made with knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the facts;

the party to whom it was made must have been
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~ithout

knowledge or the means of knowledge of the real facts;

it must have been made with the intention that it should be
acted on; and the party to whom it was made must have relied on
or acted on it to his prejudice (31 CJS p. 402, Estoppel, §67).
Bank has admitted it claims no fraud and cannot extend
its case to prove negligence.

Too many elements are lacking

upon which to base its claim for estoppel.
To constitute a waiver, there must be an existing
right, benefit, or advantage, knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of such right, benefit or advantage, and an
actual intention to relinquish it, or such conduct as warrants
an inference of relinquishment (31 CJS p. 408, Estoppel, §67).
The bank cannot seriously claim that UTG purposely
wived or intended to relinquish its right to a set-off.
These are arguments completely answered by the recent
Utah Supreme Court case of Maytime Manor, Inc. vs. Stokermatic,
, Inc.,

Case No. 15975, June 19, 1979 [not yet reported] which

announces, in an equitable lease reformation case, that:

*

* *for this Court to affirm the District
Court's judgment, it need only conclude that
the evidence presented to the District Court
does not clearly preponderate against the
findings of that Court.
This was a case where the District Court had granted

reformation and the Supreme Court was asked to reverse on the
ground that the evidence was not "clear and convincing".

In
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this case the trial court has found there was no evidence to
support estoppel but Bank is seeking a finding that not only was
there evidence but that it was clear and convincing.
As to the right of UTG to set-off claims to which it
was lawfully entitled see Chase Manhattan Bank vs. State, 357
NE2d 366 (N.Y. 1976).

CONCLUSION
The Bank has intentionally waived its right to a
literal or a strict enforcement of its security in the turkeys
and their proceeds.

Bank has converted its interest in the

collateral to the rights of an assignee.
For the reasons expressed heretofore the rights of
Bank can rise to no higher level than any rights which Carlson
Brothers may have against UTG.

Carlson Brothers has no rights

but a deficit of over $31,000.00.

The Uniform Commercial Code

subjects whatever rights Bank had to the defenses and set-offs
UTG has exercised.
The trial court has found on Bank's second theory
that there was no negligence and no duty giving rise to a claim
against UTG in favor of Bank and those findings are supported
by an abundance of evidence.

There was neither, as Bank

claims, any unjust enrichment or basis for restitution and
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UTG had the duty to its grower members to off-set the Carlson
Brothers' account for excess payments previously made to the Bank.
To reverse the trial court's findings and ruling would
be to compel UTG not only to pay twice but to pay the same
entity twice and the penalty would be visited upon the innocent
member growers of UTG who would be forced to sustain the loss.
For those reasons the decision of the trial court should
be affirmed.
DATED this 20th day of August, 1979.
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